Genealogy of collective intentionality: Max Scheler and Michael Tomasello

Jaromir BREJDAK*

ABSTRACT

The present paper attempts to look at on the genealogy of both shared intentionality and collective intentionality, comparing Michael Tomasello's concept with Max Scheler's three-dimensional concept of intentionality: ens amans, ens volens, ens cogitans, as affective, conative, and cognitive intentionality. I focus on various forms of affective collective intentionality — Schelerian forms of sympathy — to show collective subjectivity from the whole spectrum of emotional intentionality, presented by Scheler's example of parents standing over the corpse of a child. Even though Tomasello's works seem to empirically corroborate Scheler's intuitions about the emotional genealogy of collective intentionality, they will differ in the horizons within they locate intentionality. In the case of the evolutionary psychology of Tomasello, we can talk about the horizon of cooperation, in the case of Scheler's Scheler's phenomenology of acts about the horizon of responsibility or co-responsibility, which gives intentionality its unique character. The similarities of both concepts concern the following pillars: 1) genealogy of intentionality covering the dimension of affective intentionality, conative intentionality, and the level of cognitive intentionality; 2) Imitation or, as Scheler would say, following someone. Because a person is recognized by the author of Formalism as an act, or a bundle of acts, the way to understanding and communication with another person is the maieutic co-execution of their acts — i.e., imitation. The maieutic co-execution of acts of others triggers the constitution process of a person, both on an individual and community level. We can speak, in the case of Tomasello, about the ontho- and sociogenetic function of co-executing acts or imitating; however, in the case of Scheler, we are dealing with the clearly axiological nature of such a constitution of both the individual and collective subjectivity (axiological ego, axiological communio); 3) collaborative engagement as a driving force behind collective intentionality in one case in form of co-responsibility, a nature of a collective person (Scheler); in the other case in form of collaboration developing intentionality to various units of community life (Tomasello).

* Ph.D. (habil.), professor of philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Szczecin. E-mail: jaromir.brejda@univ.szczecin.pl.

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INTRODUCTION

In the ongoing interesting discussion on collective intentionality, the impact of phenomenology of community seems to be quite rare and unremarkable. Dietrich von Hildebrand, Martin Heidegger and Max Scheler are barely mentioned (Schmid, 2005; Schmid, 2015; Zahavi & Satne, 2015; Salice & Taipale, 2015; Salice, 2016; Krebs, 2010; Cusinato, 2015). Hence my motivation to outline Scheler’s concept of collective intentionality, which is also found in his *The nature of sympathy* and *Formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics of values: A new attempt toward the foundation of an Ethical Personalism, ethical personalism* (Scheler, 1973). The first shows a broad spectrum of emotional acts of sympathy, which lead to different forms of communal units. The second enlightens the phenomenon of communal unity more from the perspective of values and the communal subjects formed by them. These combined approaches give us a complex perspective on the issue of collective intentionality: first, from the perspective of manifold acts, whereby acts of sympathy correlated with values build the core of human identity, followed by acts of will, leading ultimately to acts of cognition (*ens amans, ens vollens, ens cogitans*); second, from the perspective of values, correlated with emotional acts. This leads to a complex picture of macrocosms of values forming human microcosms of various communal units, and individual ones, including the identity of human beings — the so-called *ordo amoris*.

The issue of intentionality appears in the phenomenology of Max Scheler in several contexts. In simple terms, we can describe these contexts as psychological, axio-anthropological, and sociological. The phenomenological approach does not allow us to fix any ready context, similar to regional ontologies. According to phenomenological, transcendental, and eidetic reductions, the phenomenologist tries to look at this whole horizon in the many correlations like a correlation between emotional acts and values, or a correlation between emotional acts and social unites or a correlation between social unites and values. The first context is the analysis of human emotional life, from which we learn that already at the level of vitality, including higher living beings, initial intentionality appears, which constitutes higher forms of intentionality like culture, nation, state, or ecclesia. Another context is issues related to the concept of a person as *ordo amoris*, where identity is defined by many kinds of values (axiological ego — Józef Tischner). There we learn that the human being, due to
its constituting order, is an emotional being, *ens amans*, a volitional being *ens volens* and a conscious being *ens cogitans*. Man is *ens amans* before he becomes *ens volens*, and before he subsequently becomes *ens cogitans*. We can assign these three dimensions of existence to three levels of intentionality: the emotional one, the conative and the cognitive. Another context is the sociological with its social unities, such as mass, life-community, society, a collective person in the sense of culture, nation or ecclesia. Scheler attributes collective intentions to these forms of community, in particular to the collective person and life-community. In our attempt to reconstruct the issue of collective intentionality, we will focus on the sociological context: the context of community — forms, which we will then supplement with the characteristics of emotional intentionality, presented based on Scheler’s of parents standing over the corpse of a child. From these first remarks emerges a pre-theoretical dimension of intentionality similar to that of Heideggerian concern *Sorge* presented erenow by Scheler as different kinds of feeling or emotional intentionality related to the whole spectrum of values, which gives the intentionality strong axiological character. Apart from its pre-theoretical character, another feature of intentionality is its maieutical dimension, which is both based on and requires participation. As we recall, Heidegger in his criticism of Husserl's intentionality emphasizes its sense of acting — *Vollzugssinn*; Scheler, in turn, presents a person more radically: as a bundle of acts whose co-execution is a condition of participation in the being of another person; participation, not cognition — because cognition would reduce this process to the epistemological dimension only.

The present paper attempts to look at the genealogy of both shared intentionality and collective intentionality, comparing Michael Tomasello’s concept with Scheler’s three-dimensional concept of intentionality: *ens amans, ens volens, ens cogitans*, as affective, conative, and cognitive intentionality. I focus on various forms of affective collective intentionality — Schelerian forms of sympathy — to show collective subjectivity from the whole spectrum of emotional intentionality presented by Scheler’s example of parents standing over the corpse of a child. Even though, Tomasello’s works seem to empirically corroborate Scheler’s intuitions about the emotional genealogy of collective intentionality, they differ in the horizons, within which they locate intentionality. In the case of the evolutionary psychology of Tomasello, we can talk about the horizon of cooperation; in Scheler’s case about the Scheler’s phenomenology of acts about the horizon of responsibility or co-responsibility, which gives intentionality its unique character.

Do the forms of emotional intentionality, such as 1. community of feeling, shared, mutual feeling (*miteinanderfühlen, unmittelbares Mitfühlen*), 2. parallel feeling, 3. fellow-feeling or compassion (*Mitgefühl*), inc. vicarious, reproduced feeling (*Nachgefühl*), and 4. emotional infection (*Gefühlansteckung*) sufficiently
encompass the individualistic, the relational and the objectivistic accounts of collective intentionality (mentioned by Tollefsen, 2004b)\textsuperscript{1}.

Let's now look at the issue of collective intentionality through the prism of Tomasello’s evolutionary psychology. Its origins and genealogy have been described and researched in his *Natural history of human thinking*, among other places.

**EMOTIONAL SHARED INTENTIONALITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EVOLUTOINARY PSYCHOLOGY BY MICHAEL TOMASELLO’S**

The authors of *Understanding and sharing intentions. The origins of cultural cognition* (Tomasello et al., 2005) state that infants already have a strong motivation to share emotional states with others in the very early stages of ontogenesis, and that even before the age of one they show motivation to share goals and perception.\textsuperscript{2} From around twelve to fourteen months of age, this motivation goes beyond sharing goals and perception and enters the phase of dividing action plans, formulating common intentions and participating in the scene of shared attention. The authors propose to adopt the hypothesis according to which, apart from being able to compete with others, people have developed the skill and motivation to participate in activities involving cooperation based on common goals and intentions as well as on common attention. In the first year of a child’s life, evolutionary psychology distinguishes between the following three stages of developing the ability to act based on shared intentionality: dyadic, triadic, and collaborative engagement (Tomasello et al., 2005: 681).

1. Dyadic engagement: Sharing behavior and emotions.
   
   “An individual interacts with, and is mutually responsive to, an animate agent directly — mainly through the expression of emotions and

\textsuperscript{1}I attempt to sketch Scheler's phenomenology of the community in relation to the ongoing, decades-long debate about shared and collective intentionality (joint intention, shared intentionality, collective intentionality in *Max Scheler’s concept of collective intentionality within the current debate about collective subjects* (Brejdak, in preparation). Tollefsen, 2004b; Schmid, 2005; Schmid & Schweikard, 2009 serve as references and at the same time as successful attempts to synthesize the main positions referred to with the concept of, we-intention, a field of research initiated mainly in “We-Intentions” (Tuomela & Miller, 1988), who demonstrated the existence of not only individual but also collective intentions. Based on the discovery of collective intentionality, John Searle announced the birth of a philosophy of society: a new branch of philosophy, dealing with issues of collective intentionality and leading to his social ontology (Searle, 1990; Searle, 1995; Searle, 2010). Intentionality is defined there as the property of the mind which has the power to create social reality, generating premises for human action different from individual desires. Searle, as Krzysztof Gajewski notes, is convinced of the reality and ontological autonomy of collective intentionality (Gajewski, 2016: 95).

\textsuperscript{2} For an interesting approach, see: Cusinato, 2018; Zahavi & Satne, 2015.
behavioral turn taking” (Tomasello et al., 2005: 681). This is a momentary sharing of the attention and intentions of the other person. This is the intentionality of the I-You type labeled as protoconversation.

2. Triadic engagement: sharing goals and perception. It occurs when perceiving subjects interacting towards a common goal. At this stage, intentionality goes beyond the I-You relationship to the level of a more universal horizon within which the perspectives of the participants move.

3. Collaborative engagement: Joint intentions and attention.

An individual interacts with an intentional agent toward some shared goal and with coordinated action plans as manifest in a joint intention — and with joint attention (mutual knowledge) as well. Each interactant thus cognitively represents both the shared goal and action plans involving complementary roles — with the possibility of reversing roles and/or helping the other in his role, if necessary (Tomasello et al., 2005: 681).

Commitment to cooperation: shared intentions and shared attention. Here, the entity interacts with other entities, aiming at a common goal and guided by coordinated action plans, which take the form of a common, lasting, and joint attention, whose durability goes beyond the moment of current activity, including e.g., tradition or action for the future generation.

Besides individualistic intentionality, there are basically two types of mutual one attributable to these stages: shared intentionality and collective intentionality. The difference between them means the extension of parallel perspectives to a permanent shared perspective within the framework of a project based on norms, principles, and the tradition of achieving goals, with participants with whom, unlike the dyadic relationship, it is not necessary for us to have direct contact. We are dealing here with a diachronic community with others already absent, but who are still present — thanks to tradition, or absent because they are not yet born, but present in a responsibility horizon for example, for the well-being and fate of our planet. The transition from intentionality directed at the other person to group intentionality means entering the world of culture, the birth of the individual in forms of community life, the foundation of which is not language but emotions similar to Scheler’s account. It should be mentioned here that the three constituent levels of collective intentionality recall Scheler’s constitution of both individual and collective subjectivity defined as: ens amans, ens volens and ens cogitans. In the analysis of intentional acts, we can distinguish three levels of intentionality, shown by Scheler as follows:

a. Cognitive acts focused on cognitive content create processes that allow the accumulation of knowledge. (I see a shady tree).³

b. Conative acts are aimed at achieving a goal or effort. (Looking for shelter under a shady tree).

c. Affective acts determine the emotional state (I feel dignity when I see a shady tree).

Let us now look at the genealogy of the collective subject in terms of the author of *A natural history of human thinking*.

1. Sharing feelings (“protoconversation”)

Protoconversation is an automatic and pre-reflective diffusion, interpenetration of emotional states, especially pronounced between persons directing their stream of attention. Human infants and adults — as we read in *Understanding and sharing intentions* — interact with one another dyadically in what are called *protoconversations*. These are social interactions in which the adult and infant look, touch, smile, and vocalize toward each other in turn-taking sequences. But as most observers of infants have noted, the glue that holds protoconversations together is not just contingency but the exchange of emotions (Schmid & Schweikard, 2009).

Gallese mirror resonance seems to confirm this type of covert simulation. Evolutionary psychology also speaks of “primary intersubjectivity” (Trevarthen, 1979) of bodily interaction and pre-reflective participation in the common sphere of primary intersubjectivity.

So before we are in a position to theorize, simulate, explain or predict mental states in others, we are already interacting with them and we understand them in terms of their expressions, gestures, intentions and emotions, and in how they act toward us and others. Importantly, primary intersubjectivity is not primary simply in developmental terms. Rather, it remains primary throughout the life span, across all face-to-face intersubjective experiences, and it underpins those developmentally later practices that may involve explaining or predicting mental states in others (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012: 210).

Protoconversation seems to refute the assumptions of simulation theory by assuming first the inaccessibility of other people’s states and assuming the priority of ego in understanding other people’s states. Thus, it avoids exemplary aporia, which seeks a solution to the problem of how to assign emotional states to the bodies of other people. As Tomasello and other authors emphasize, during protoconversation, adults and babies do not simply imitate and do not respond to behaviors by accident, but often express the same feelings and emotions — only by other means. Protoconversation, although it is the basis of understanding, like Scheler’s feeling of unity (*Einsfühlung*) and affective contagion (*Ansteckung*), does not yet contain any common obligations towards shared goals or action plans. Guido Cusinato (Cusinato, 2018: 151) points out that emotional sharing is the beginning of the birth of a human being as a social being, but equally as an individual. One could even speak of a second birth in an emotional and spiritual sense due to emotional sharing.
Actually, the newborn does do something, by crying it seeks its mother’s attention and closeness, not only in a physical, but also in an emotional sense. When a newborn comes into the world without being born completely and carries on being born purely thanks to care relationships and emotional sharing practices, the development of this emotional intimacy with the mother becomes [...] essential (Cusinato, 2018: 151–152).

2. Shared intentionality

When individuals who understand one another as intentional agents interact socially, one or another form of shared intentionality may potentially emerge. Shared intentionality, sometimes called “we” intentionality, refers to collaborative interactions in which participants have a shared goal (shared commitment) and coordinated action roles for pursuing that shared goal (Tomasello et al., 2005: 680).

Collaborative interactions within the horizon of joint commitment seem to correspond to a degree of solidarity or shared responsibility both at the level of community of life and collective person in Scheler’s concept. “Sharing a significant emotion — as Cusinato emphasizes — means both individuation processes and strengthening our emotional bonds as well as pursuing our birth in the trans-subjective spaces of living-together (Miteinanderleben) and feeling-together (Miteinanderfühlen)” (Cusinato, 2018: 152).

3. Collective intentionality

The authors of Understanding and sharing intentions postulate collective or team intentionality as a kind of social predisposition, giving motivation and cognitive ability to feel, experience and act together with others — that which — we can call, considering the final result of individual development, team intentionality.

Collective intentionality is, as Daniel Żuromski notes, a fundamental ability for cultural inheritance processes that enables the sociogenesis of various types of products and cultural learning (Żuromski, 2016: 154). In the fourth year of life, co-intentionality turns into the ability to understand beliefs and desires in collective intentionality, which in turn enables the capture of phenomena such as social practices and institutions (e.g., money or marriage) and is the result of engaging for years with others in sharing and adopting different perspectives (perspective shifting) and reflective discourse containing constructions expressing propositional attitudes.

4. Imitation

By ontogenetic hypothesis of the authors cited here, in the first year of life, a typical course of human development is based on 1) a highly developed reading of intentions and 2) a strong motivation to share mental states, which led to participation in joint cultural practices.
Imitation is considered the “main factor of cultural transmission”. In conclusion, the cited authors believe that the specific difference of homo sapiens, whose DNA overlaps with 99% of chimpanzee genetic code, is co-intentionality enabling joint actions. They propose that the small difference, that has made so much impact, is an adaptation to participate in activities involving cooperation with others, including co-intentionality. This required the selection of individuals in the evolution process, who possessed an exceptionally well-developed ability to read intentions and the motivation to share mental states. During ontogenesis, these two components — understanding intentional action and motivation to share mental states — intertwine with each other to create a unique path of the cultural development of human cognition, which is characterized by special forms of social involvement, communication with symbols and cognitive representations.

Scheler’s ethics of authenticity was based, as we remember, on the mechanism of imitation, or more precisely the two pillars of participation in the being of other persons, whose culmination was following someone (Gefolge), in the sense of existential maieutic based on cooperation. The first pillar was fellow feeling or emotional understanding (Verstehen) with other persons constituted by unique values (Brejdak, 2017: 113–126).

Scheler’s collective intentionality, let us recall, began at the level of a sense of unity and vitality, including animals, and through higher forms of sympathy such as compassion (Mitgefühl), and shared feeling (Miteinerfühlen, join feeling), reached the full forms of joint intentionality referred to as the collective person (Gesamtperson), among other community forms: mass, life-community, society and collective persons of the nation, culture, and ecclesia. The similarities of both concepts concern the following pillars: 1) genealogy of intentionality covering the dimension of affective intentionality (ens amans), conative intentionality (ens volens), and the level of cognitive intentionality (ens cogitans). Man is, as Scheler says, ensamans before it becomes ensvolens, before it in turn becomes ens cogitans; 2) Imitation or, as Scheler would say, following someone. Because a person is recognized by the author of Formalism as an act, or a bundle of acts, the way to understanding and communication with another person is the maieutic co-performance of their acts — i.e., imitation. The maieutic co-execution of acts of others triggers the constitution process of a person, both on an individual and community level. We can speak, in the case of Tomasello, about the ontho- and sociogenetic function of co-executing acts or imitating; however, in the case of Scheler, we are dealing with the clearly axiological nature of such a constitution of both the individual and collective subjectivity (axiological ego, axiological communio); 3) collaborative engagement as a driving force behind collective intentionality in one case in form of co-responsibility, a nature of a collective person (Scheler); in the other case in form of collaboration developing intentionality to various units of community life (Tomasello).
EMOTIONAL COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MAX SCHELER’S AXIOLOGICAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Below we want to show a variety of forms of sympathy or affective intentionality characterized by a varied degree of community — parallel feeling, compassion, shared feeling — using the example of parents standing above the corpse of a deceased, beloved child. Let us now try to reconstruct Scheler’s example by extending it slightly to a funeral situation with an old lady passing away and a household friend, who turns up at the funeral. Asking about the ontological basis of affective or emotional intentionality we can distinguish four different cases — four different forms of emotional intentionality and sympathy: 1) immediate community of feeling (shared, mutual feeling — *Miteinanderfühlen*, *unmittelbares Mitfühlen*); 2) parallel feeling; 3) fellow-feeling / compassion (*Mitgefühl*) including vicarious, reproduced feeling (*Nachgefühl*), and 4) emotional infection (*Gefühlansteckung*).

Ad. 1. Immediate community of feeling (*unmittelbares Mitfühlen*) of mother and father. In this case, the following criteria are met:

a. Common orientation to value (life of a son and basically his loss).
   
   Mother and father make up a collective person, they have a common *ordo amoris*, a common axiology, a common world of values built over the years (one could speak of an axiological communion in analogy to Tischner’s axiological ego).
   
   b. The same quality, the essence of an emotional act (e.g., mourning).
   
   c. Interaction building the common tissue of community — i.e., a collective person. The mother reacts not only to the loss of her son but also to her husband’s sadness, and vice versa, thus creating the same collective person established in the reproduction of the same acts. The interaction that takes place in the common horizon of values developed over the years makes them become one collective person, characterized by one stream of experience that is

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4 For a very interesting perspective, see Krebs, 2010: 9–44; Daly, 2014; also Cusinato & Brutomesso, 2015 as a valuable collection of articles on the topic Max Scheler and The Emotional Turn.

5 “Let us turn to fellow-feeling (*Mitgefühl*), which is primarily based upon those constitutes of ‘vicarious’ understanding already dealt with. Here there are four quite different relationships to be distinguish. I call them:
   
   1. Immediate community of feeling (*das unmittelbare Mitfühlen*), e.g., of one and the same sorrow, ‘with someone’.
   
   2. Fellow-feeling ‘about something’ (*Das Mitgefühl ‘an etwas’*); rejoicing in his joy and commiseration with his sorrow.
   
   3. Mere emotional infection (*Gefühlansteckung*).
   
   4. True emotional identification (*Einsfühlung*)” (Scheler, 2008: 12).
indifferent in terms of me and you. (Separation occurs here at the level of consciousness and sensuality). Scheler talks about the passage of the same qualitative acts (e.g., sadness, mourning) from A to B and vice versa.

The concept of acting as a shared body which Margaret Gilbert’s calls joint commitment seems to be close to Scheler’s position, although unlike Gilbert, he treats individual intentionality (individual) and collective intentionality (collective person) equally. In turn, showing the intentionality from the affective level, *ens amans*, seems to be confirmed only in Tomasello’s report.\(^6\)

The Schelerian unity of participation in being a second person here is based not only on emotional participation in a supra-individual stream of emotions, described by emotional contagion or, emotional identification (*Einsfühlung*), comparable to emotional protoconversation, but also the commonality of acts passing between participants connected by a strong emotional bond. The act’s commonality extends this unity resulting from participation in the common stream of emotional experiences to a spiritual level with a strong axiological tone, defined as a collective person or collective intentionality.

Ad. 2. Parallel feeling

This case occurs when strangers attend a funeral ceremony. Each of them experiences their loss individually and in their own way. We are here dealing with a virtual denial of the first case.

a. Lack of common value orientation enabled by community of feeling (*unmittelbares Mitfühlen*).

b. Different quality of the act (sadness, mourning, reflection).

c. No explicit interaction.

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\(^6\) The thesis on shared feelings based on the feeling of someone else’s feeling is probably Scheler’s most controversial thesis. This thesis — as we remember — was rejected by almost all the phenomenologists, including both Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. Starting from Scheler’s ideas, Stein presented in her dissertation on the issue of empathy and in the work on community and the individual, a critique of this position. The edge of this criticism strikes at the originality of the feeling of someone else’s feeling, which Scheler gave the characteristics of internal perception. As Stein notes, I perceive other people’s feelings internally, as well as my own. Originally, there is a “certain indifferent stream of experience” from which only “own” and “other people’s” experiences crystallize slowly. According to Stein, unlike inner perception, it is not sourced in the same degree. We see the difference: in one case, presenting is source, in the other non-source. If I experience a certain feeling as someone else’s feeling, “I have it once for the source as now my own, once for no source, in the feeling as originally someone else’s. And it is this source of data that empathizes my feelings that prompts me to reject the common name ‘internal perception’ to capture my own and someone else’s experience” (Stein, 2014: 110). The aforementioned studies of evolutionary psychology showing the existence of a mechanism of emotional protoconversation, or “mirroring” of emotions, seem to shed new light on this polemic.
We can say that this kind of parallel feeling occurs in social unities like society, which for Scheler is not an organic, true community form, but only a summation of individuals bound by conventions or a social contract.

This position is an individualistic view of participation in the life of the community. It is related to the cases of intentionality we reduced to the individual dimension with all nuances to various shades described by John R. Searle or Wilfred Sellars (Searle, 1990; Sellars, 1968; Rorty, 1970).

Ad. 3. Fellow-feeling/compassion (*Das Mitgefühl “an etwas”*).

This case occurs when a household friend appears at a funeral, who is associated more with the parents than with their deceased son, which means that he directs his emotional attention to them.

a. Lack of direct, common orientation on value; this orientation is implied mainly due to vicarious, reproduced feeling (*Nachfühlen*).

b. Direct orientation to the parents’ emotionality, the reproductive feeling of their sadness (*Nachfühlen*) and the reaction of the response to this reproductive act of feeling. In fellow-feeling, compassion, as in the first case, it is possible to pass qualitatively the same act from A to B and vice versa.

c. Possible direct interaction (*Mitfühlen*, cofeeling). In contrast to the first case, the feelings of father and mother are objectified. The condition for moving from a state of compassion to a community of feeling — the first case — would be love.

This kind of emotional co-intentionality seems to be close to Bratman’s relation-based position, emphasizing the relationship and interaction between the participants of joint action. What makes Scheler’s stand out is the affective approach to intentionality, which appears in correlation with the values that underpin the community bond.

Ad. 4. Emotional infection

This case could be exemplified by a situation when an old woman walks near a funeral ceremony and is overcome by sadness.

a. Lack of common value orientation.

b. Lack of the same quality of emotional act.

c. No real interaction, but we have a pre-reflective feeling of unity on the vital level.

True, in this case, means resulting from the same axiology and co-performing the same acts as in compassion or in community of feeling. This kind of emotionality funds a community form known as mass or a sense of tribal unity. This type seems to meet the conditions of protoconversation described by Tomasello as the basis for the emergence of higher forms of intentionality. In the context of emotional protoconversation, the authors of *Understanding and shared intentions* cite Stern’s research (1985), pointing to the inevitability
of so-called “Mirroring” emotions and behaviors. Scheler, as noted above, is a phenomenologist of mysticism of the act of unification, occurring in the entire spectrum of actual human emotionality, starting from the emotional identification, and ending with the collective person (Brejdak, 2016a). In The nature of sympathy, Scheler showed that the experience of another human being covers all spheres of existence and begins with automatically occurring emotional identification (Einsfühlung), which is the basis for the creation of higher forms of sympathy — vicarious feeling (Nachfühlung) — which in turn is the foundation on which fellow-feeling and compassion (Mitgefühl) arise. The experience of another human being but also of living beings is conditioned by the fullness of all forms of sympathy, starting with the feeling of unity, which means that the minimum unspecified feeling of unity is constitutive to capture every living being — the simplest organic movement as opposed to the movement of inanimate matter — as a living being; on this most primal foundation of the presentation of other beings (Fremdgegebenheit), the simplest “feeling” is built, and even more the simplest “compassion”, of them all, spiritual “understanding”.

In other words, a man tends, in the first instance, to live more in others than in himself; more in the community than in his own individual self. This is confirmed by facts of child — psychology, and also in the thought of all primitive peoples (Scheler, 2008: 247).

In addition to the wealth of precisely described forms of feeling, Scheler wants to convey to us his cognitive ideal, inspired by Nietzsche’s perspectivism. It requires from us the care and cooperation of all the emotional forms acquired throughout life.

It seems as though certain kinds of knowledge can be acquired only in youth or not at all. “To old to learn” applies in a more than merely quantitative sense. […] Every advance in intellectual capacity involves an increasingly extensive decline in these other powers. The ideal to aim at should be a synthesis — between progress and the maintenance of tradition—including the revival of what threatens to become extinct — together with an integration of sequence of tasks assigned to each phase of development, from animal to man, primitive to civilized, child to adult (Scheler, 2008: 32).

Besides

Beside the emotional context of cooperation of all forms of emotional acts we have the personal one documenting the existential growth and development of man in the encountering of the personal exemplar. The exemplar forces one to transcend one’s limitation, opening new horizons of deeper identity. In Scheler’s ethics of value the fundamental means of experiencing the

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7 We can speak of a kind of inner cooperation by using the Tomasello’s term in a slightly different sense.
reality of values is through an emotional encounter with people, who embody those values. The maieutic condition of participation in the world of values of the other, involves an act of following, that is their realization. In this context of existential growth and development of man in the encountering of personal exemplar, the relationship between a person and his/her personal pattern cannot really be captured as a cooperation relationship, because it is motivated by stronger emotions such as inclination, affinity, or love. This seems possible at the level of culture or nation, where collective intentionality does not require emotional bonds as strong as love, then the collective intentionality meets the condition of cultural transmission.

Furthermore, apart from emotional and personal cooperation, one can also talk about social cooperation between different forms of community, found in the thesis: there is no state without a community of life. Why? Because the state is bonded by solidarity, born, and developed in the community of life as well as in the community of persons as centers of experiencing. The success of each of these forms of life depends on the successful cooperation of all of them.

To these contexts of cooperation we can add a final one: the context of cultures. Scheler prefers to speak about cosmopolitical cooperation concerning different cultural circles: European culture and Asian culture, especially China and India.

The same can also be said of the racial element in the composition of cultural communities. For in the total enterprise of human knowledge no one people can altogether take the place of another. Only long-term and simultaneous cooperation on world-wide scale between the individual yet complementary portions of humanity can bring into play total capacity for knowledge inherent in mankind at large, without distinction of time and place (Scheler, 2008: 32).

Scheler criticizes Comte’s theory of stages underlining that: “The phases of evolution are never merely steppingstones, for each has a unique character and value of its own. Evolution is never merely a progress, for it always involves decay as well; while Man himself is the ‘first citizen’ of creation rather than its ‘lord and master’” (Scheler, 2008: 32).

An important concept that should be noted here is the Schelerian concept of ethos as a variable system of emotive a priori, various preference systems throughout history. It is not only other cultures that allow for a deeper experience of the world through a different perspective; but also diachronic views within the same culture that allow for a deeper understanding of oneself, as shown, for example, by Charles Taylor in The sources of the Self.

In my understanding, Scheler’s coordination idea is a continuation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, where one absolute perspective is replaced with a wealth of possible perspective approaches. However, this coordination is not
justified pragmatically or evolutionarily, but ethically due to the basic form of personal emotionality, which is co-responsibility not only for the other, but solidarity with the whole world as well:

in the collective person every individual and the collective person are self-responsible (= responsible for oneself), and at the same time every individual is also coresponsible for collective person (and for every individual “in” it), just as the collective person is coresponsible for each of its members (Scheler, 1992: 246).

SUMMARY

Non-egological model of consciousness

Consciousness is not necessarily self-awareness. Max Scheler was undoubtedly one of the first who, with the publication of Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle (1913), known from our second, altered edition, entitled The essence and forms of sympathy, began to disturb and provoke philosophical thought based on subjectivism with his theses about the genetically original experience of the community before any ego isolation and self-realization as an isolated individual. Discovering the specific ontology of a collective person (Gesamtperson), which is a condition for understanding other existences Scheler’s ontology opposed the two prevailing theories of understanding another person, both the theory of analogy and the theory of empathy (Einfühlungstheorie), rejecting their assumptions as false on the following points:

a. The originality of presenting one’s self in relation to the sphere of us. This objection can be transferred to simulation theory, which, like the theory of analogy, presupposes the primordiality of the “I” in reaching other people's emotional states.

b. The primordial experience of the human body (Körper) relative to the overall and non — indifferent body — spirit whole. Also, here the addressee of this criticism may be the theory of theory assuming the unavailability of mental states of other people.

Scheler outraged the phenomenological world with his thesis about the possibility of a presentational source of different minds or psyche. Internal perception, he believes, extends not only to the psychological sphere of oneself, but it also covers the psychic sphere of others. Forms of sympathy such as emotional infection, emotional identification, fellow-feeling, or community of feeling, make us live a shared life in an “indifferent stream of experiences”, without distinguishing between our own and the foreign spheres.

What occurs, rather, is an immediate flow of experiences, undifferentiated as between mine and thine, which actually contains both our own and others’ experiences intermingled and without distinction from one another (Scheler, 2008: 246).
Scheler defines the ability to distinguish these spheres as maturity (Reife); before it occurs, we live in emotional infection and an emotional identification (Einsfühlung), without awareness of our own self and others. This mutual unifying process occurs both at the level of vital feeling (community of life) and at the level of personal feeling (collective person). Nothing is more certain than this: we think both our “thoughts” and the “thoughts” of others, we feel both our feelings and the feelings of others. Scheler seems to accept Husserl's position from the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen, in which he assumes non-egological awareness. It is not cogito but cogitare that is a necessary condition for conscious living. Our awareness of time has to some extent a non-egological nature, as the author of Formalism pointed out.

Genetic order of emotions, values and knowledge

Scheler, similarly to Gilbert, emphasizes the normative background of common subjectivity. This normativity emerges primely from the value horizon, which next to the existential and essential ones, forms our experience of reality, including different, correlated feelings. Normative moments are related to the sociology of values and the sociology of emotions. The normative core of values constitutes further normative aspects, such as a common will and the mutual obligations of different group members.

The basic nexus is this: there can be no society without life-community (though there can be life-community without society). All possible society is therefore founded through community. This proposition holds both for the manner of “accord” and for the kind of formation of common will. Mutual living-with-one-another and its content are the origins of the non-formal premises that serve in society as bases for analogical inferences establishing the “inner” life of the “other”. [...] And the duty to keep mutual promises that are in a contract, the basic form of the formation of a uniform will in society, does not have its source in another contract to keep contracts. It has its source in the solidary obligation of the members of the community to realize the content that ought to be for the members (Scheler, 1973: 531).

In these case and analogous ones our proposition implies that the character of obligation and the sanction of the contracts into which individuals or groups enter always presuppose a further communal whole to which they simultaneously belong, and that this sanction stems from the unitary collective will of this whole (Scheler, 1973: 533).

Scheler, as we saw in the first part, is a co-creator of the sociology of knowledge, who shows knowledge as a derivative of the relationship of being, especially in its axiological dimension (Wertsein). Heidegger’s approach to understanding (Verstehen) and mood (Stimmung) as a way of being, here coincides with the intention of the author of Sociology of knowledge.
The problem of the origins of our knowledge of other minds, past, present, and future, includes a range of questions almost unnoticed hitherto, concerning the genetic order in our knowledge of the various essential group-forms which have to be distinguished in the study of human social groups. Thus, it can be shown that the knowledge of the existence and character of mental life in the group comprising the “community of irreplaceable spiritual persons” already presupposes a knowledge of existence and a nature of other peoples within “society”; that the indirect knowledge of other which occurs in the social type of group, again presupposes the much more immediately given knowledge of other which can only be obtained from a communal mode of life (preliminary in the family). Even this knowledge, however, can only arise because, in the early stages of infancy, our mental pattern corresponds to that which can be also ascribed to the hard, the horde and the mob; for at that time we absorbed unconsciously, by means of true identification and a genuine “tradition”, certain contents and functions of other minds (or dispositions to revive such contents and functions), which we should have been quite unable to acquire at the later stage, or in any other psycho-social group-structure than that of the horde, the mob and the herd (Scheler, 2008: 219).

Scheler shows the constitutional process of various forms of community life founded on protoconversation in the forms of emotional infection and emotional identification. Scheler approaches Bergson’s intuition, considering reality as a living organism, élan vital, with which we are connected by the bonds of intuition and sympathy.

The person as an axiological oriented bundle of acts

The specificity of Scheler’s phenomenology of emotional life is the assumption of a correlation between acts of intentional feeling and values. Emotionality is a way to present, and present in us, the values that become the foundation of our identity by shaping our volatility and cognitive capabilities. The joint commitments, which constitute Gilbert’s collective subjectivity, find in Scheler their counterpart in the binding power in the emotionality of the participants and their supra-individual values. The link between values and the person as their bearer are acts of the person in three dimensions: affective, conative, and cognitive. Remember that Scheler’s collective subject is the center of acts directed at either the other person or at itself. Participation in the act center of a collective person consists of co-executing the acts of other people in their orientation toward the subject they intend and the value horizon; co-executing of intentional acts in their three dimensions: amans — volens — cogitans.

A collective person is not the sum of persons, but a joint concurrent action characterized by a responsibility for other members of the community and in the same modus for oneself.

From the essential types of social unity thus far mentioned, namely, mass, society, and life-community, we must distinguish the highest essential type of social unity, with whose characteristic we began this chapter: the unity of independent, spiritual,
and individual single persons “in” an independent, spiritual, and individual collective person. [...] For on this level any finite person is an individual person and at the same time a member of collective person. It simply belongs to the essence of a finite person (fully known as such) both to be so and to experience himself so (Scheler, 1980: 533).

The balance of responsibility is an important characteristic of a collective person. Here we come to another difference specific to Scheler’s phenomenology: it is essentially the phenomenology of acts and their joint execution. This is not just another mode of individual intentionality (Searle) but a collective intentionality which is equivalent with it, and even genealogically prior to it. Scheler would agree with supporters of the theory of theory in assuming the inaccessibility of other people’s mental states, to a limited extent. The author of *Nature of sympathy* speaks of the double transcendence of a person; double because it is inaccessible to the objectifying cognition, avoiding co-performance; and inaccessible to co-performing due to its intimacy, which remains as intimacy, i.e., inaccessibility through cognition, noticed but inconceivable. Scheler’s spectrum of various forms of collective subjectivity, mass, community of life, society and the various forms of the collective person, with the types of emotional intentionality that fund them, seem to cover the three models of community subjectivity presented, among others, by Searle, Bratman and Gilbert. In addition, Scheler’s genealogy of the collective unities seems to find its empirical fulfillment in Michael Tomasello’s evolutionary psychology, where the constitution of subjectivity based on the described stages of shared and collective intentionality and initiated by protocoversation have their counterpart in the concept of emotional intentionality correlated with various forms of social unities, their values and knowledge. In this way Scheler’s and Tomasello’s analyzes introduced a new dimension of source emotionality to the analytical philosophy of society, which is focused on the analysis of language. The society is built in pre-linguistic mode, emphasized unanimously by Scheler and Tomasello. The first manifestation of uniquely humans forms of cooperative communication emerge in pre-linguistic emotional communication.

But there are also some significant differences between Scheler’s phenomenology of emotions and Tomasello’s evolutionary psychology. While Tomasello points out the cooperative nature of shared emotionality, Scheler goes further, making acts of shared responsibility for the Other the nucleus or the soul of a collective person (*Gesamtperson*). His consistently developed phenomenology of acts leads Scheler both to an actualist conception of the person as an act-center and to demonstrate his idea of act-driven solidarity. This approach is accompanied by an attempt to regain the axiological dimension of reality which gives direction to the processual reality, realized thanks to a community of solidarity. Due to the noetic dynamics of the duplication of acts (Kierkegaard), a collective person becomes a living organism, for the growth and decline of
which we are all responsible. Over the centuries this living organism of resonating acts, despite the passage of time, fully reflects both the strength and the nature of history itself and a collective person co-created in time and beyond it. Scheler’s intuitions, seem to anticipate both the widely discussed issues of collective intentionality and collective subjectivity, as well as Tomasello’s work in evolutionary psychology, emphasizing the emotional as well as the super specific, nature of mutual responsibility and solidarity.8

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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8 Regarding Max Scheler as philosopher of the process of solidarity see: Brejdak 2020; Brejdak, 2015; and Brejdak, 2017.


